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RECENT CASES.
BANKS AND BANKING- CHECKS- PAYMENT AFTER NOTICE NOT To
PAY. - PEOPLE'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST Co. v. LACEY, 40 SO. 346 (AL..) -
Held, that it is no defense to an action by a depositor against a bank that
it paid his check; payment having been after notice from him not to pay it.
The drawer of a bank check may, by notice to bank before its presen-
tation for payment or acceptance, revoke the check. Tramell v. Farmers'
Nat'l Bank, ii Ky. Law Rep. goo. The check being considered merely an
order on the bank for which the bank is not liable. Schneider v. Irving Bank,
30 How. Prac. (N. Y.) i9o. But it is too late to revoke after bank has re-
ceived the check, given credit to the holder, and charged up the check to
the drawer, such acts being deemed payment. Albers v. Com. Bank, 85 Mo.
173. When a bank has paid a check after notice not to do so, it must re-
fund the amount so paid. Pub. Grain & Stock Exch. v. Kune, 2o Ill. App.
i37. But the bank is bound to pay to holder the amount of a check sent to
it by him which it has in its possession when notified not to pay by the
drawer. Freund v. Imp. & Trad. Nat'l Bank, 12 Hun. 537. Death of the
drawer will act as a revocation of authority of bank to pay the amount of
the check if death occurs prior to acceptance by the drawee. Nat'l Com.
Bank, v. Miller, 77 Ala. i68; Simmons v. Cin. Say. Soc., 5 Ohio Dec. 527.
But where a good consideration was given for a check, death does not re-
lieve the drawee from an obligation to pay upon presentment. Lezois v. Int.
Bank, 13 Mo. App. 202.
CARRIERS- INJURIES TO PASSENGERS -CAM PEQUIRED, SPOONER V. OLD
COLONY ST. Ry'. CO., 76 N. E. 66o (MASS.) -Held, that on becoming a pas-
senger on a Street Railway, it became defendant company's duty to provide
for his benefit proper facilities for transportation, including proper servants,
and to carry him safely over his route to his destinaton.
Carriers of passengers are liable only for negligence, MeClenagan v.
Brock, 5 Rich Law 17 (So. Co.), and are liable for even .the slightest negli-
gence, Baltimore & 0. R. Co., v. Wightman, 26 Am. Rep. 384. A carrier
of passengers is not liable for casualties against which it was unable to
guard by the utmost prudence and care, Ken. Cent. R. Co., v. Thomas, 79
Ky. i6o. Street railways are bound to exercise extraordinary 'diligence.
Holly v. Atlanta Street R. R., 34 Am. Rep. 97. Carriers of passengers can.
not relieve themselves from the obligation to observe ordinary care by any
contract whatsoever. Cooley on Torts p. 826. Prima facie, where a passenger,
being carried on a train, is injured without fault of his own, there is a legal
presumption of negligence, casting upon the carrier the onus of disproving
it. Laing v. Colder, 8 Penn. St. 479. Must supply safe vehicle, Spear v.
Philadelphia W. & B. R. Co., 5 Pa. co. ct. R. 393. The reasons for this
line of decisions seems well summed up in the words of Cooley on Torts, p.
795: "Shall not he who has entrusted his person and life to the control of
the company, to be carried by them in vehicles of their own selection and
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2nanagement, rely upon the injury itself as entitling him to redress, and leave
to tlhe defense the task of exculpatory evidence?
CAamas -PASSENGER ELEVATORS -DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED- En-
WARDS v. MANUFAC RERS' BUILDING Co., 6i COL. 446 (R. I.). Held, that
a landlord who maintains an elevator in his private building for the use of
tenants and their employees and customers, is not a common carrier, nor
baound to use the same degree of care as that imposed on a common car-
rier, but is bound to exercise only reasonable care for the safety of those
who enter upon his premises and use the elevator.
In the above case the Supreme Court of Rhode Island rejects the rule
adopted in the majority of the states and which imposes upon a landlord
maintaining an elevator in his private building the same degree of care in
running the same as that required of a common carrier of passengers, name-
ly, the highest possible degree of care. The Court bases its opinion on the
ground that a landlord does not occupy the same relation to the public as
that occupied by a common carrier. The landlord is not the servant of the
public. His duties are confined to tenants and their customers. The rule
applied in the case of a common carrier is based on the relation of such
carrier is based on the relation of such carrier to the public and not on the
danger of the journey. Therefore, since the landlord does not stand in
the same relation to the public the reason for the application of the rule
fails. The Rhode Island Court follows the rule of New York laid down
in Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 197.
CONTRACTS- CONSTRUCTION.- ST. LOUIS DRESSED BEEF AND PROVISION
CO. V. MARYLAND CASUALTY Co. 26 SP. CT. 400. This case came up before the
Circuit Court of Appeals on Review and was referred by that court to the
Supreme Court of the United States, Plaintiff was assured by defendant
in a general accident policy against the claims of persons injured through
the negligence of plaintiff's servants while engaged in its business. Para-
graph 7 of the policy read:-" The assured shall not settle any claim, except
at his own cost, nor incur any expense, nor interfere in any negotiation for
settlement or in any legal proceeding, without the consent of the company
previously given in writing . . . And paragraph 8:-" No action shall lie
against the company as respects any loss under this policy unless it shall be
brought by the assured himself to reimburse him for loss actually sustained
and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after trial of the issue." After
the issuing of the policy one Mrs. H. was injured by a horse and vehicle
driven by a servant of plaintiff. Damage suits were brought by the injured
woman and also by her husband. Plaintiff notified defendant of the institu-
tion of the suits, but defendant, claiming that the driver was not a servant of
the plaintiff, refused to defend and claimed the terms of the policy as a justi-
fication. As a matter of fact, the driver was a servant of plaintiff. Plain-
tiff at once employed counsel and investigated the injury done to the plain-
tiffs, Mr. and Mrs. H., and, concluding that they had a very good case,
settled out of court for a sum found to be reasonable under the circum-
stances. Suit is now brought against defendant to recover the amount paid and
counsel fees. Defendant rests on the terms of the policy denying liability
and especially sets up the clause in paragraph 7 as to the consent of the as-
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surer in writing, and that in paragraph 8 as to settlement "without a judg-
ment after trial of the issue."
Held, that plaintiff may recover amount paid in settlement and also the
attorney's fees which were found to be reasonable. The principle that
one who has a claim against another is bound to use due care and not allow
expense to pile up unnecessarily where it might be avoided by ordinary
foresight does not seem to have been considered by the court in deciding the
case.
CORPORATIONS - INOIViDUAL LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS- NATIONAL
BANK - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. RANKIN v. BARTON, 26 Sp. CT. 29.-
Held, that a state statute of limitations does not begin to run against the
right to enforce the individual liability of stockholders in a national bank,
until the amount of such liability has been ascertained by the Comptroller of
the Currency.
If the United States were compelled to pay the circulating notes of
a national bank, on its contract of guarantee, it would have a paramount lien,
on the assets of the bank for reimbursement. Therefore, since the bank is
an instrumentality of the United States, the duty of administering the assets
of the bank is vested in an officer of the United States, namely, the Comp-
troller of the Currency. On his order only can the individual liability of a.
stockholder be enforced. It is, therefore, necessary for the Comptroller of
the Currency to determine the amount of the liability of the stockholder be-
fore a right of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run.
CRIMINAL LAW - ARSON - EVIDENCE - PREvious Fins. - PEOPLE v.
BROWN, 96 N. Y. SuPP. 957. Held, that in a prosecution for arson, alleged
to have been committed with intent to secure insurance money, admissions
made by defendant to an insurance adjuster that he had had fires in other
buildings than the one in question were inadmissable. Spring, J., dissenting.
Upon the trial of a prisoner for setting fire to a building with intent to
defraud the insurers, evidence showing that up to five years previously sev-
eral buildings in which the prisoner was interested and which were insured,
were burnt, is irrelevant. State v. Raymond, 53 N. J. L. 261. In a charge
of bribery evidence of previous attempts on the part of the defendant to
commit bribery is not admissable, though it might show, in a moral sense,
that he would be likely to commit the crime with which he is charged.
People v. Sharp, lO7 N. Y. 427. The rule is that another act of fraud is ad-
missable to prove fraud charged only where there is evidence that the two
are parts of one scheme or plan of fraud, committed in pursuance of a common
purpose. Jordan v. Osgood, Iog. Mass. 457; Commonwealth v. Bradford, 126
Mass. 42. But an assured having lost several other vessels evidence of such
loss was admissable, as on a question of intent, any other transactions from
which any inference respecting the quo animo may be drawn are admissable,
though it has sometimes been thought that such other transactions should
be cotemporaneous, or nearly so, but that is not essential. Howe v. Home
Ins. Co., 32 Conn. 21. Where a defendant is charged with firing a house to
defraud the insurers, it is admissable for the prosecution" to prove that
on prior occasions houses occupied by the defendant had been burned,
though, as a general rule, evidence of distinct antecedent acts or transactions
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is to be rejected as inadmissable against a person on trial for a particular
offense. Rafferty v. State, 91 Tenn. 656.
CRIMINAL LAw - CONDUCT OF TRIAL - REMARKS OF JUDGE - O'SHEA V.
PEOPLE, 75 N. E. 981 (ILL.). Held, in homicide, where the sole defense is
insanity and the evidence is conflicting and the question close, the jury
should be given no intimation by the trial judge as to the merits of the de-
fense.
As a general rule, trial judges are inhibited by statute from discussing
or commenting upon evidence. Rodrignez v. State, 5 S. W. 255; Wessels v.
Beeman, 87 Mich. 481. Any remark tending to show the court's opinion has
been held error, as a remark by trial judge "has it not already been shown
that conspiracy existed to admit the evidence;" this being held to be a viola-
tion of a statute forbidding the judge making any remark calculated to con-
vey to the jury his opinion of the case. Crook v. State, ii S. W. 444; Kirk
v, State, 32 S. W. 1045. It was held error for a court in the trial of a crim-
inal case to make a remark to, or in the presence of, the jury, in reference
to matter of fact, which might in any degree influence them in their ver-
dict. State v. Hurst, ii W. Va. 54; State v. Swayze, 30 La. Ann. 1323. But
it is said that the expression of the opinion of the judge, on the weight of
testimony, is not matter of error in law. Gale v. Spooner, ix Vt. 152. If
the case is in the least doubtful upon the evidence it might be error for the
judge to express an opinion Vpon the evidence, but sometimes it might be
the duty of the judge to express his opinion upon the evidence. Johnston v.
Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 54. It seems that in the South and West a re-
striction is put upon the court by statutes, while in the East and Federal
Courts the matter is one within the discretion of the court to a great extent.
DAMAGES- PERSONAL INJURIES- PLEADINGS. - HYNDS V. BROOKLYN4
HEIGHTS RY. Co., 97 N. Y. SIUPP. 705. Held, that a complaint for personal
injuries, alleging that plaintiff was struck in the abdomen and bruised,
blackened, and injured there, and internally, authorizes evidence of eruptions
that came out on the abdomen, though they were caused by the abdominal
pains. Hirschberg, P. J., and Hooker, J., dissenting.
General advertisements of personal injury are sufficient in the absence of
exception, Graham v. . H. Banland Co., 89 N. Y. SuPP. 595; Fuchs v. St.
Louis Trans. Co., Ill Mo. App. 324, and under an averment of a particular
injury, all natural effects of that injury may be shown. Comstock v. George-
town Twp. ioo N. W. 788 (Mich.); Nichols v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co.,
28 Utah 319. But where particular injuries are described there can be
no recovery for others not described. Brown v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 94 N.
Y. Supp. 19o; Union Pac. Ry. Co., 79 Pac. 152 (Kans2). Such injuries as do
not necessarily result from the defendant's wrongful act, but flow from it as
a natural and proximate consequence must be specially alleged in order that
the defendant may have notice thereof and be prepared to meet the same
upon the trial. z Greenleaf on Evidence, Sec. 254; Treadwell v. Whittier, 80
Cal. 574; Gumb v. Railway Co., 114 N. Y. 411. Where the complaint al-
leges the nature and permanent character of the injuries, the permanent loss
and damage to plaintiff by reason of his impaired capacity, because of the
injuries, for attending to business, may be given in evidence and considered
by the jury in fixing the amount of damages without being specially pleaded.
Wade v. Leroy, 61 U. S. 44; Tyson v. Booth, IOO Mass 266.
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DEATH - WRONGFUL ACT - RIGHT OF ACTION. - B. & 0. R. R. Co., v.
CHAMBERS, 76 N. E. 9I, (OHIO). Held, that no action can be maintained in
the courts of Ohio upon a cause of action for wrongful death occurring in
another state, except where the person wrongfully killed was a citizen
of the State of Ohio.
This case lays down a comparatively new rule in this country. In gen-
eral, whenever, by common law or statute, a right of action has become
fixed and a legal liability incurred, that liability, if the action be transitory,
may be enforced and the right of action pursued in the courts of any
state which can obtain jurisdiction of the defendant, provided it is not against
the public policy or the laws of the state where it is sought to be enforced,
Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co., 31 Minn. Ii; Atchison, To-
peka & Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. Keller, 76 S. W. 8oi; St. Louis & C. R. R. v.
Brown, 62 Ark. 254. Such action is on the same footing as to its transi-
tory nature as an action of tort at common law, where statutes are substan-
tially similar, and the exercise of comity between states is not prejudicial
to the state's own citizens, Leonard v. Columbia Steam Navigation Co., 84
N. Y. 48; Chafec v. Fourth National Bank of New York, 71 Me. 514. The
courts of Maryland hold, however, that no action can be maintained upon
a statute of this kind if the deceased person received the injury at a place not
within the limits of the state. Allen v. Pitts. & C. R. R. Co., 45 Md.
41. The courts of New York will not take jurisdiction of an action between
non-residents for a tort committed in another state, unless special circum-
stances exist. Collard v. Beach, 81 N. Y. Supp. 619. The discrimination be-
tween residents and non-residents is probably based upon reason of public
policy and the courts of New York should not be vexed with litigation be-
tween non-resident parties over causes of action which arose outside of its
territorial limits. Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 112 N. Y. 315.
Affirmed in Hoes v. NV. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 173 N. Y. 435.
DEDICATIoN - LImITED TO PUBLIC USE. - YOUNG v. LANDIS TP. nx AL.,
62 ATL. REP. 1133. (N. J.). Held, that land may be dedicated to a restricted
public use, and, if accepted, must be taken for the limited purpose only.
Therefore the township had no authority to widen the driveway as pro,
posed by an ordinance.
Dedication of land to the public may be so made as t.o indicate the spe-
cific public use which is intended, as for a footpath, etc., and acceptance of
such a dedication would be limited to the use designed, Mercer v. Woodgate,
L. R. 5 Q. B. 26; Trustees of M. E. Church v. City of Hoboken, 33 N. J.
Law, 13; City of Buffalo v. Delaware L. & W. R. R. Co., 39 N. Y. Supp. 4.
The chief reason for these decisions is that the dedication is considered as
being in the nature of a gratuity, therefore any limitation, condition, etc.,
attached to or imposed upon the grant will be upheld. Nothing passes to
the public but the easement, the fee remains in the original owner. Cincin-
nati v. White, 6 Pet. 431. In the absence of expressed and formal dedication
and acceptance, it may be effectuated by the acts, declarations and ac-
quiescing conduct of the parties through such a period of time as will give
rise to the conclusive interference of intent to dedicate and to accept.
Cook v. Harris, 61 N. Y. 448. A use by the public at least for twenty years
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has frequently been held to be evidence of the acceptance of a dedication,
Washburn on Easements, p. 197; Angell on Highways, §162.
DIVORcE-SEPARATION FROM BED AND BOARD - EvIDENCE. - HARRisoN v.
HARRISON, 4o So. 232 (LA.).-In weighing the facts in a suit for separation
from bed and board, held, that the court will be mindful that there may
have been in the life of the parties a great deal which, owing to the mouth
of the plaintiff being sealed, it may have been impossible to bring to the at-
tention of the court.
The complainant in a divorce case is under the obligation to establish,
by full, clear and adequate evidence, the charges made in his bill, and not
merely to create inference, suspicion or doubt. Hampton v. Hampton, 87
Va. 148. Divorces ought never to be decreed without clear and satisfactory
evidence of the wrong which the law treats as justifying cause for a divorce.
Edmond's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 232. And the complaining party must prove
every element of the offense. Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, 6th Ed., Vol.
II., §279. However it is not necessary to prove the allegations of the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is sufficient if they be established by a pre-
ponderance of evidence. Smith v. Smith, 5 Or. 186. Yet the evidence must
be "full and satisfactory" before the court can proceed to decree a divorce.
Moore v. Moore, 22 Tex. 237. It is not sufficient for the court to have
a moral conviction of the guilt of the party: it must be satisfied that such
conviction is founded on legal evidence, applicable to legal charges. Caton
V. Caton, 13 Jur. 431. So a party asking a court for a divorce must prove a
full and complete case. Nothing is to be taken in favor of the applicant by
presumption or intendment as to the facts. Linden v. Linden, 36 Barb. 61.
The principal case is peculiar in that the court inferred that important tes-
timony might have been tendered if it had not been excluded by a rule of
evidence. And each inference was considered of weight.
EMINENT DOMAIN -PUBLIC USE-EFFEcr OF LEGISLATIvE ACTION.-
TANNER V.. TREASURY TUNNEL MINING AND REDUCTION Co., 83 PAC. 464
(COLO.). Held, that while the judgment of the legislature in conferring the
power of eminent domain for certain purposes is not conclusive on the courts
on the question of public use, it is entitled to great weight.
The determination of the legislature is not conclusive that a purpose for
which it directs private property to be taken is a public use. Talbot v. Hud-
son, 82 Mass. 417; Arnsperger v. Crawford, 6I Atl. 413. Whether a par-
ticular use for land is public or not is a question for the judiciary. Call v.
Town of Wilkesboro, 115 N. C. 337. There seems to be some conflict as to
who shall judge of the necessity. Whether a public highway, which is for
public use, is a necessity or not is a question for the legislature to deter-
mine. Call v. Town of Wilkesboro, Supra. The legislature is the-finaLjudge
as to the necessity of taking private property for public use. Glover v. Lime
Point, 18 Cal. 229; Concord Rw. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47. The right of deter-
mining the necessity may be delegated and courts and juries may be called
upon to determine as to its necessity. Water Works Co. of Indianapolis v.
Burkhart, 61 Ind. 364. Question of necessity may be vested in courts by
statute. Wheeling & L..E. R. R. Co., v. Toledo Ry. & Term. Co., 74 N. E.
2g9. Paul v. Detroit, 32 Mich. xo8, is contra and holds that the necessity for
such use is the subject of judicial inquiry only.
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EvIENc-HoMICmIDE- THREATs BY DECEASED.- STATE V. TOLLA, 62
ATL. 675 (N. J.). The defendant, a woman, had been previously assaulted
several distinct times by the deceased. The defense tried to introduce evi-
dence of the persistence of the debaucher, the constant repetition of the in-
sult, and the wife's inability to put an end to the insult even in her hus-
band's presence. Held, that in a homicide case, testimony of antecedent
threats or acts of violence by the deceased against the defendant are not ad-
missible, when it appears that at the time of the homicide there was no threat
or act by the deceased, which, even in the light of any previous threats or
acts could justify the homicidal act. Garrison, Dixon, Bogert, Vredenburgh,
and Vroom, JJ., dissentmg.
As a general rule the evidence of threats is admissible only where there
is some other evidence of an overt act or hostile demonstration on the part
of the deceased. Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. iio; State v. Harrison, 35 So.
56o (La.) ; Gilmore v. People, 124 Ill. 38o. The dissenting judges based their
opinion on the fact that the evidence ought to have been admitted, not as tend-
ing to justify the homicidal act, but because of the obvious bearing of such tes-
timony upon the degree of the defendant's crime. Their opinion is supported
by Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 138, which holds that evidence of threats unaccom-
panied by any acts of aggression is admissible to show the state of feelings
of the parties toward each other at the time of the killing. Evidence of
this kind has also been admitted as furnishing a reasonable inference that
the deceased sought the defendant for the purpose of executing those
threats. Liebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571.
GAmE- FEDEmR STATUTES - CONSTRUCTION.- PEOPJI EX R.., SILZ V.
HESTmERG, SHERIFF.-96 NEW YORK SUPPL., 286. Held, that U. S. Stat.,
providing that all dead bodies of foreign game animals, the importation of
which is prohibited, or the dead bodies of wild game animals transported into
any state or territory, shall, upon arrival in such state or territory, be sub-
ject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or territory en-
acted in the exercise of its police powers, relates to the transportation of game
from one state to another, and has no application to the importation of game,
which is not prohibited and which constitutes a conceded article of com-
merce, from a foreign country. Miller and Jenks, JJ., dissenting.
There seems to be no decisions, since this law was enacted, upon for-
eign importation, but it is generally held that an act prohibiting the having
in possession of game birds, though brought from another state where the
killing is not prohibited, is constitutional, and within the power of the
legislature to pass, as it does not conflict with any law which Congress has
enacted and is a power, which lying dormant, may be exercised by the
state, Phelps v. Racey, 6o N. Y. io; State v. Farrell, 23 Mo. App. 176; Roth
v. State, 5i Ohio St. 2 9; Magner v. The People, 97 Ill. 320; Commonwealth
v. Hall, 128 Mass. 410; People v. O'Neil, 71 Mich. 325, while upholding the
constitutionality of such a statute, deny that the prima facie having in pos-
session is sufficient to convict, holding that defendant may show that birds
were killed in another state and not in violation of the law of such state.
These decisions were rendered before the passage of the U. S. Statute, as
above, and this act would seem to remove any doubt as to the constitution-
ality.
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HIGHWAYS-USE OF AUTOMOBILES-NEGLIGENCE IN OPERATING AUTo-
MOBILE. - MCINTRyE V. OnrNn, 76 N. E. 750 (IND.). Held, it was negli-
gence for an autoist to drive his automobile at the rate of more than I5
miles an hour toward a team of horses which were frightened at the ma-
chine, where th6 autoist saw or could have seen, when 300 feet away, that
the horses were frightened.
The case above is a very interesting one from many standpoints, the
chief of which is from that of its being seasonable. Questions are bound
to arise in great numbers due to the increasing use of this method of loco-
motion, totally unknown a short time ago. So that any well decided point
cannot fail to be of use as a precedent and aid in settling these questions
in the future. At present it is difficult to find many cases of this kind re-
ported. There being no question of the right of an automobile to the use
of the highway, it becomes a question of what kind of a use. It is obvious
that it must as in all other cases be a proper use. As to use of vehicles in
general see Payne v. Smith, 4 Dana 497; Angell on Highways p. 441 et
post. The law of the road will not tolerate any inconsiderate and reckless
disregard of the rights of other travelers on the highway. Railway v. Long,
112 Ind. 166; Benjamin v. Holyoke R. Co., 16o Mass. 3. Parties owe to
each other the duty of reasonable care. Baker v. Fehr, 97 Pa. 70. In the
case of the auto it does not seem that the defendant used this care. It was
not prudent driving. In the case of Mason et al., v. West, 70 N. Y. (Sup.)
478, it was held that a verdict for damages to the Plaintiff was justified
from the evidence. The evidence was that the auto gave out a loud puffing
sound and was running at the speed of 1o or 12 miles an hour and did not
slacken until the horses became frightened.
MARRAGE -VALMITY.- CHAMBERLAIN V. CHAMBERLAN, 62 ATL. 68o.
(N. J.). Held, that when a man and woman marry but the marriage is
subsequently shown to be illegal by the existence of the wife's former hus-
band, when she subsequently obtains a decree of divorce from the former
husband and it is shown that they still believe themselves married, their
relations are lawful.
Where one of the parties to a valid marriage contracts a second mar-
riage, the second and bigamous marriage is not rendered valid by a sub-
sequent decree of divorce dissolving the prior marriage. Teter v. Teter, ioi
Ind. 1i2; Hunts' Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 294, as the decree becomes operative
only when rendered. Estate of Cook, 77 Cal. 220; Alt v. Banholzer, 39
Minn. 511. But where the relation was begun under a contract of marriage
supposed to be legal, though in fact void, in consequence of the disability
of one of the parties, yet after removal of the disability a subsequent mar-
riage may be presumed from acts of recognition of each other as husband
and wife, and from continued matrimonial cohabitation and general repu-
tation. Collins v. Collins, 8o N. Y. 9; Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa 228.
Without the proof of the subsequent actual marriage such marriage will
not be presumed from continued cohabitation and reputation of a relation
between them which was of illicit origin. App. of Reading Ins. Co., 113
Pa. St. 204.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES -WAGES OF LABoRERs-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-
GIEs v. BROAD, 83 PAC. 1028 (WASH.). Held, that a municipal ordinance
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providing that the rate of wages for laborers on work done by contract
for the city in the improvement of the streets shall not be less than a cer-
tain sum for a calendar day's work of eight hours, is constitutional and
valid.
The state may within its police power look after the health, safety
and comfort of its citizens. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366; State v.
Buchanan, 29 Wash. 603. And the only state, perhaps, that holds the eight
hour law, as applied to miners, invalid is Colorado. It re Morgan, 28
Colo. 415. It is clearly within the power of the state to limit the number
of hours a laborer may be permitted to work in one day on any public
work undertaken by it. In re Dalton, 61 Kan. 257; People v. Beck, 30 N.
Y. Supp. 473. The power to do this rests upon the principle that it be-
longs to the state to prescribe the conditions upon which it will permit
public work to be done on its behalf. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 2o7. A
contractor or laborer cannot object upon constitutional grounds to a lia-
bility which he has voluntarily assumed, in consideration of a benefit con-
ferred. Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 517.
NUISANCE - ACTION FOR DAMAGES - LEASED PREMISES. - MILLER ET AL.:
v. ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. OF N. Y., 76 N. E. 734 (N. Y.). Held, that
plaintiff could not recover for any depreciation in the rental value pending
the lease as the tenant was alone entitled to recover for any such injury.
Gray, Bartlett and Haight, JJ., dissenting.
The settled rule of law seems to be that the owner of the reversion
may sue in an action on the case when an injury to his reversionary in-
terest is committed, 4 Kent's Cont. 119; 8 Pick. 235; 31 Iowa 138; Tiffany
on Real Property Vol. I p. 93. The judges of the majority opinion in the case
supra admit this but hold that the injury necessarily must be of a permanent
character, 29 N. Y. Sup. iooO. It is also admitted that the defendant, having
separate assets, may sue for the diminution of his enjoyment of the prem-
ises. But when the question of which shall sue for the depreciation of
rental value comes up the authorities are in conflict. The case of City of
Eiffaula v. Simmons, 86 Ala. 515, holds that the damage suffered was
properly measured by the diminished rental value of the premises for the
year during which the nuisance continued if he elected to claim only for
that period, waiving the question of permanent injury. The Tallman case,
121 N. Y. 118; Lawrence case, 126 N. Y. 483; Whitmark v. N. Y. Elev.
R. R., 76 Hun. 302; Diermnger v. Wehrinan, (Dist. Ct.) 12 Wkly Law Bul.
222, substantially hold to the same view. But the majority opinion in the
case reported hold that these cases or the Elevated R. R. cases are sus
generis and are governed by. principles which apply to no other class of
cases. They are supported in this view by, Stowers v. Gilbert, 156 N. Y.
6o4; Ottentot v. N. Y. L. & W. R. Co.. 119 N. Y. 6o3; Uline v. N. Y.
C. & H. R. R. Co., ioi N. Y. 98.
PATENTS - CONTRACTS - ROYALTIES. - BENNETT v. IRON CLAD MFG. CO.,
96 N. Y. Sup. 968. Defendant acquired the right to manufacture and sell
plaintiff's patented article during the life of the patent, and agreed to pay
plaintiff a royalty on each article manufactured. On defendant's failure
to pay the royalties, plaintiff recovered judgment for the royalties and for
-the cancellation of the contract. The judgment was affirmed on defendant's
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appeal. Pending the appeal it continued to make and sell the article. Held,
that plaintiff was entitled to recover the royalties specified in the contract
on the articles made pending the appeal; his failure to procure an injunction
restraining the manufacture and sale pending the appeal not procluding a
recovery on the contract. Spring and Hiscock, JJ., dissenting.
A. license does not become ipso facto void on a failure to pay royalties
even if it contain an express stipulation to that effect. Standard Dental
Mfg. Co. v. Nat. Tooth Co., 75 Fed. 291. There must be some proper pro-
ceeding and a rescission in equity. Hanifen v. Lupton, 95 Fed. 465. The
question in this case is obviously the effect of the judgment of the lower
court pending appeal. When the case is to be tried anew upon appeal as
upon original process, the effect of the appeal is to vacate and render null
the judgment. Powell on Appellate Proceedings, c. 9. It is very clear
that if the judgment remained good, the original cause of action would be
merged in it, and might even be pleaded as a bar to it. Curtiss v. Beardsley,
i5 Conn. Si. So, in an early case, it was held that the judgment of the
common pleas, when regularly appealed from, becomes wholly inoperative.
Campbell v. Howard, 5 Mass. 376. These cases must be distinguished from
those where the appeal is in the nature of a writ of error or for review of
errors only. In the latter class, the appeal does not vacate the judgment
but merely suspends its execution. Curtiss v. Root, 28 Ill. 367. Some cases
have held, however, that in either case the appeal does not suspend or super-
cede the force of the judgment. St. v. Chase, 41 Ind. 356; Walls v. Palmer,
64 Ind. 493.
RAmoADS -CQossnrG ACCmENT,- CON iBUTORy NEGLIGExCE- INFzR
PEasoNs.-ToLmo P. &. W. Co., v. HAMM=, 77 N. E. (Iu.) 72. Held,
that a deaf person on approaching a railroad crossing is required to be more
careful in order to avoid contributory negligence than a person not so afflicted.
Highway travelers approaching a railroad crossing are charged with dil-
igence to ascertain if a train is about to pass by; and their diligence must
be greater accordingly as the particular locality and the circumstances of the
case seem to require greater caution. Morris v. Chic. M. & St. P. R. Co.,
26 Fed. 22. The care and caution required of a person in crossing a railroad
track is such reasonable care and caution as a man of ordinary prudence
would exercise in similar circumstances. Wichita & W. R. Co. v. Davis,
37 Kan. 743. This usually requiring the traveler to "look and listen.' Easley
v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 113 Mo. 236. So it is gross negligence for a blind person
to attempt to cross a network of tracks unattended, where he knows that
trains are passing. Fla. Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Williams, 37 Fla. 406. A greater
degree of care is imposed upon an infirm person to avoid danger in crossing
the tracks, but the responsibility of the railroad is not increased by the fact
of plaintiff's deafness. Cleveland, C. & C. R. Co. v. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 57o;
nor by the fact that plaintiff was blind in one eye, Marks' Adm'r v. Petersburg
R. Co., 88 Va. i; unless the employees in charge of the train know of the in-
firmity. C. C. & C. R. Co. v. Terry, supra. Generally speaking an engineer is
bound to use ordinary care but iot the highest degree of care when ap-
proaching a crossing. C. R. L. & P. R. Co. v. Caulfield, 27 U. S. App. 358.
And to protect a person in a helpless condition. Yoakum v. Mettasch, 26 S.
W. x29. But not to stop a train, even when possible, because an idiot is on the
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track, the fact of idiocy being unknown to him. Daily v. R. & D. R. Co., xo6
N. C. 3oi.
STATES - TORTS - PERsONAL INyuRIES - NEGLIGENCE OF VOLUNTEER. -
SPENCER V. STATE, 97 N. Y. Supp. I54. Held, that where the foreman of a
repair gang in the employ of the state and engaged in replacing the old
flooring of a bridge silently acquiesced in the act of a stranger, who desired
to remove boards for his own use, the state was liable for injury to a third
person, resulting from the negligent performance of such act by the stranger.
Parker and Chester JJ., dissenting.
In the absence of statute a state is not liable for the negligence of its
officers in the discharge of their ordinary duties, Chapman v. State, io4 Cal.
69o. But the maxim, "the king can do no wrong," does not imply that
the state cannot do an act for which the citizen is not entitled to redress.
Its real meaning is that the right to sue must be voluntarily given by the
state not coerced, Metz v. Soule, 40 Iowa 236; 2 Blackstone 255. If there
be a statute allowing the state to be sued then we are to treat the state
as an individual and the question arises, would an individual be liable in the
case cited supra. Haluptzok *v. Gt. Northern Ry., 55 Minn. 446; Booth v.
Mister, 7 Car. & P 66, hold that where a servant in the employ of the mas-
ter hires another to assist him in performing acts for the master, the mas-
ter is liable for the sub-servant's acts. The reasons given are diverse. It
may rest upon the idea of implied authority, or of ratification, or of the neg-
ligence of the servant in directing or controlling the work, or of the duty
of the occupier of premises not to permit his property to become a nuisance.
The case of a volunteer is decided for nearly the same reasons, chief of
which is the doctrine of implied assent, Hill v. Morey, 26 Vt 78.
TELEPHONES AND TELEGSAPHS - PLACING OF WIRES - REGULATION BY
VILLAGE. - VILLAGE oF CARTHAGE V. CEN. N. Y. T. & T. Co., 96 N. Y. Sup.
919. Held, that where a telephone company extends its lines in a village
without permission of the trustees, the trustees can require such extension
to be taken down and placed underground, without requiring a rival com-
pany to place its wires underground; there being no such requirement as
to wires previously erected, and the rival company not appearing to have
made extensions at or after the same time. McLennan, P. J., and Nash J,
dissenting.
The right to construct a telegraph or telephone line along and upon
a street or highway must be derived from an express grant of authority.
N. Y. & N. J. Tel. Co. v. East Orange, N. J., 42 N. J. Eq. 49o. But a
municipality has no right to nullify a franchise granted to a telephone com-
pany to erect poles and wires in the streets in the absence of any provision
therein reserving the right. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Wichita, 123 Fed.
762. Where, however, the use of the streets of a city by a telegraph and
telephone company is without authority, either because of the particular
mode of use or because of the utter lack of authority to occupy the streets,
an injunction by the city will be to restrain such future use. St. v. Met. T.
and T. Co., 31 Hun. 596. Utica v. Utica Tel. Co., 24 N. Y. App. Div. 361.
And, notwithstanding telegraph lines are instruments of commerce, a city
has the right to determine how, in what manner, and upon what condi-
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tions a telegraph company shall enter the city and pass through it Mutual
Un. Tel. Co. v. City of Chicago, I6 Fed. 3o9. And, while there is no
power in a municipality arbitrarily to declare a forfeiture of the company's
right to occupy its streets, Abbott v. Duluth, 1o4 Fed. 833, neverthele6s
a city cannot, by a contract which permits a telephone company to construct
and maintain its line upon a certain street deprive itself of the power to
enact such legislation as is necessary for the public safety, general welfare,
and Convenience. Mich. Tel. Co. v. City of Charlotte, 93 Fed. ii.
TELEPHoNEs- PoLEs AN WmEs iN STREETs-ADDiTiONAL BURDEN.-
FRAzIiEm v. EAST TsNNassE. TELmPHoNE ComPANY, 9o S. W., 62o. (TENN.).
Held, that telephone poles and wires erected in the street do not consti-
tute an additional burden upon the fee of abutting owners, for which they
are entitled to compensation. Shields, J., dissenting.
Cases on this point are in irreconcilable conflict, the weight of au-
thority being to the effect that such wires and poles are an additional bur-
den. It is said that the erection and use of telephone wires and poles is
one of the new uses over which the power of the city extends as it springs
up, as well as to uses common and known at the grant of the power to the
city. City of St. Louis v. Bell Telephone Company, 96 Mo. 623. And it
is held in Missouri that telephone companies organized under the laws of
the state may set their poles and wires along the public street, without
compensation to owners of abutting fees, subject to regulation by the city.
The State ex rel v. Flad. 23 Mo. App. 185. Statute giving right to erect
poles and wires is constitutional though it makes no provision for compen-
sation to the owners of the fee. Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75. On the
other hand it is said that a telephone system not being a use to facilitate trav-
el is an added servitude to the fee. Union Elec. Tel. & Telg. Co., v. Apple-
quist, 1o Ill. Appl. 517. Ches. & Pot. Tel. Co. v. Mackenzie, 28 Am. St
Rpts. 219. The public easement includes the grading, paving, cleaning and
lighting of the highway, the apparatus of street railways and apparatus for
the protection and convenience of travelers using the way, but the right to
construct a telephone line for public use is not within this easement and
can be acquired upon the fee of abutting owners, against the consent of
such owners, only through the power of eminent domain. Nicoll v. Tel. Co.,
62 N. J. L. 733; Hodger v. Tel. Co., 133 N. C. 235.
TRIAL - ARGUmENT oF CoUmsiL - APPEAL TO SYmPATHY.- DALLAS CoN-
soLDATED Ercc ST. hty. Co. v. BrAc, 89 S. W. (Tax.) io87. Held, that
where in an action against a corporation for injuries, the evidence was
conflicting, it was prejudicial error for counsel for plaintiff to argue that
plaintiff was a poor girl and defendant a rich corporation, though such
facts were in evidence.
Where counsel uses language calculated to arouse prejudice in the
jury, an adverse party may interpose, and if the court fails or refuses to
check the abuse an exception lies. Abbott's Brief on Civil fury Trials.
2nd Ed. 399. It is not within the privilege of counsel in argument to
jury to use language calculated to humiliate or degrade the opposite party
in the eyes of the jury. Coble v. Coble, 79 N. C. 589. And he may not
avert the consequences of his remark by taking it back. Wolfe v. Minnis,
74 Ala. 386. It is the duty of the court to stop him under these circum-
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stances. Magoon v. B. & M. R. Co., 67 Vt. 177. And if such remarks are
expressly discountenanced by the judge there is no ground for error.
Dugan v. Chic. St. P. M. & 0. Ry. Co., 85 Wisc. 6o9. Where there was
conflict in evidence the verdict for plaintiff was not set aside for the mere
fact that counsel said he was poor. City of Chic. v. Todd, 5o Iil. App. 6og.
But to say "Because he (defendant) has his thousands, because the rich
opposes the "poor, shall the plaintiff be deprived of his rights," was revers-
ible error. Bitterman v. Hearn, 32 S. W. 341.
